"We have not attempted to say anything about the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1996)" (pg 12)

[Translation: Even we will not go further than "subjective experience".  To claim "consciousness" is going too far.]

In a concurrent publication, they state: 

> Consciousness is marked by the presence of subjective experience: In the philosopher’s term of art, there is “something it is like” for us to be aware of the world (1).

The reference is to (1) Nagel T (1974) What is it like to be a bat? Philos Rev 83(4):435–450.

However, I am at a presentation at which Andrew Barron is currently speaking. I can ask him any questions you might have.

PLB

             ***********************************************
The BEE-L mailing list is powered by L-Soft's renowned
LISTSERV(R) list management software.  For more information, go to:
http://www.lsoft.com/LISTSERV-powered.html