"We have not attempted to say anything about the hard problem of consciousness (Chalmers, 1996)" (pg 12) [Translation: Even we will not go further than "subjective experience". To claim "consciousness" is going too far.] In a concurrent publication, they state: > Consciousness is marked by the presence of subjective experience: In the philosopher’s term of art, there is “something it is like” for us to be aware of the world (1). The reference is to (1) Nagel T (1974) What is it like to be a bat? Philos Rev 83(4):435–450. However, I am at a presentation at which Andrew Barron is currently speaking. I can ask him any questions you might have. PLB *********************************************** The BEE-L mailing list is powered by L-Soft's renowned LISTSERV(R) list management software. For more information, go to: http://www.lsoft.com/LISTSERV-powered.html